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Abstract 
Subsequent to the Australian ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires there were a number of issues arising from 
investigations with regard to the functional stability and resilience of communications systems and the 
flow of information between emergency response organisations, and their ability to provide relevant 
information to the general public. In some cases, the transference of information failed or was late or 
ineffective with regard to decisions, advice and information broadcasting during the crisis. This was 
particularly evident in terms of managing emergency organisational information requests and field 
situational advice both to and from emergency response management teams and the delivery of 
informative advice to the public. This paper analyses one such case study with a view of applying a 
systems modelling technique to determine the viability of the communication systems and information 
exchange structures associated with an emergency response agency.  
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1. Introduction 
The Australian Federal Government in 2010 launched the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy. 
The aim of this new strategy is the continued operation of critical infrastructure in the face of all 
hazards as these infrastructure systems support Australia’s national defence and national security 
and underpins economic prosperity and social wellbeing. Therefore, a more resilient critical 
infrastructure will help to achieve the continued provision of essential services to the community 
(Australian Government, 2010). This strategy also deals with associated areas such as disaster 
protection and disaster resilience and this shift in policy is going to have a major impact upon 
Australia, as this now places disaster management under the security domain of critical infrastructure 
protection (Warren and Leitch, 2011). 
On or around Saturday the 7th of February 2009 a series of bushfires were burning across the 
southern Australian state of Victoria creating a crisis situation. As many as 400 individual fires 
occurred in various locations across the state and in their aftermath the day became known as ‘Black 
Saturday’. These fires occurred towards the end of summer during extremely hot, dry and windy 
weather conditions with temperatures reaching 46.60 Celsius (115.90 Fahrenheit) and winds in excess 
of 100kph. This, in conjunction with an intense heat wave and little or no rain for the previous two 
months resulting tinder-dry fuel loads, exacerbated the ferocity of the bushfires resulting in Australia’s 
highest loss of life from bushfires of 173 deaths and 414 injuries. Despite a total of 3582 fire fighting 
personnel from the Country Fire Authority (CFA) and the Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (DSE) being placed on standby in preparation for the extreme weather conditions 
(Teague 2009; State Library Victoria 2012).  
Initially, this paper provides a brief contextual overview of what to expect when experiencing a 
bushfire and discusses the response options and actions that affected individuals can take related to 
their circumstances. Then a discussion is undertaken to outline and identify some of the information 
communication and warning system shortfalls experienced during the ‘Black Saturday’ disaster as 
identified by the 2009 Bushfire Royal Commission. This is followed by identifying the primary 
response organisations involved, before proposing the Viable Systems Model (VSM) approach to 
assess organisational structure and communication from a systems approach perspective. The VSM 
approach is then applied to a specific bushfire event case study of the Bendigo Fire that occurred on 
‘Black Saturday’ and is discussed with regard to understanding the situation and the resilience of 
critical information communication infrastructures. 
2. What to Expect in a Bushfire 
Experiencing a bushfire of any size can be a very stressful and frightening event. While no one willing 
wants to be anywhere near an out of control bushfire, the best way to survive such a threat is to 
relocate away from the direct threat as early as possible. Typically, when a bushfire is approaching a 
location its presence is characterised by small spot fires igniting ahead of the main fire front, smoke, 
heat, noise and possibly darkness due to the smoke plume. The fire front itself can be difficult to 
pinpoint as it can approach locations from multiple directions depending on environment factors and 
geographical circumstances, with lots of smoke and burning embers landing ahead of the fire, which 
can continue for hours after the fire has passed (CFA 2012).  
Furthermore, there is an expectation that the various infrastructure systems will be disrupted or fail 
completely, including: power, mains water supplies and telecommunications. Mains water supplies will 
be affected with other residents and fire trucks accessing water, telephone lines may be cut by falling 
trees and mobile phone coverage can become congested and the loss of electricity supply will further 
compound the situation. Moreover, road travel at this time is fraught with danger due to poor visibility, 
fallen trees and branches, other traffic including many emergency vehicles and escaping livestock 
and native fauna. Then there is the personal human aspects of confusion, fear, being unable to 
breathe properly, the possibility of heat stress, dehydration and tiredness that all impact on rational 
decision making during the crisis itself (CFA 2012). 
These are the obvious factors that will occur when a bushfire is threatening individual residents and 
communities and therefore having a predetermined plan to survive a bushfire is a recommendation 
made to all rural and regional residents in Victoria. Having a well written and rehearsed plan of action 
will assist those affected, with what needs to done in preparation if the choice is to stay and defend 
property rather than evacuating. However if the plan is to evacuate, then authorities recommend 
enacting this early rather than at the last moment when the threat is imminent (CFA 2012).  
3. Stay and Defend or Evacuate? 
In Australia emergency bushfire response falls within the jurisdiction of the States and Territories, the 
powers granted to the emergency service organisations are in some cases different in particular 
circumstances enabling emergency services organisations to implement forced mandatory evacuation 
of people from their homes (Loh 2007).  
The policy in the State of Victoria regarding community response to bushfire, directs residents to 
Prepare, Stay and Defend or Leave, which is locally known as the ‘stay or go’ policy. This approach to 
bushfire preparation has been developed over many years based on research and experience of past 
bushfire incidents. It stipulates that with proper planning and preparation, most building structures can 
be defended during a bushfire, alternatively the plan is to voluntarily depart the location early (Teague 
2009).  
Obviously, to enact any plan successfully there is a need for timely warnings and information; in fact 
the community expects and depends on the broadcasting of high quality and detailed information 
before, during and after a bushfire. Furthermore, there is an expectation that timely warnings and 
information will be communicated to emergency response agencies during a crisis so they can 
allocate resources to respond appropriately and proportionately to the situation. However, in terms of 
the ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires there was issues with the effectiveness of communicating information 
and warnings (Jackson 2009; McDermott 2009; Teague 2009).  
4. Information Communication and Warnings? 
The subsequent state government sponsored Royal Commission into the ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires 
noted a number of weaknesses and failures with the Victorian warning systems where warnings were 
often delayed, meaning many people were not at all aware of the amount of time they had to respond 
or the magnitude and circumstance of the bushfire threats. This information shortfall was not only the 
case for people in the affected communities, but also for the localised bushfire emergency response 
services and teams in the area (Teague 2009; Jackson 2009). 
Prior to the ‘Black Saturday’ disaster the State Government had devoted significant resources 
towards a campaign of informing the broader Victorian community of the potential fire risks in relation 
to the weather conditions and environmental circumstances. While this was beneficial, it could not on 
its own construe that the information provided could be universally translated into direct awareness 
and preparedness for what would eventuate. It is the quality of the information and the multiple modes 
of dissemination, linked with the capacity of people to listen, comprehend and act on the information 
provided that is the basis of a shared responsibility between government and the community (Teague 
2009).   
It is the ongoing provision of bushfire information that prepares communities, the Royal Commission’s 
findings were that the delivery of warnings was inadequate, with techniques to capture people’s 
attention (i.e. sirens) when warnings were broadcast not being used. Similarly, the use of local 
community sirens, commercial radio and television was not encouraged either. Furthermore during 7 
February, the emergency telephone call services (Telstra’s Triple Zero service) were overwhelmed by 
demand resulting in calls going unanswered and callers not being connected to the relevant 
authorities resulting in a large number of abandoned calls. Other sources of information and warnings 
did not cope with the level of demand either with people attempting to access emergency service 
websites and about eighty percent of calls to the Victorian Bushfire Information Line left unanswered, 
which was further compounded with incomplete or out of date information for those that did get 
through (Teague 2009).  
Recommendations of the Royal Commission investigation broadly suggested that improvements to 
the dissemination and provision of information and warnings to the public where as follows (Teague 
2009):  
 improving the quality of bushfire information and warning messages by adopting standard 
language already developed for national usage; 
 simplifying the format of bushfire warnings; 
 reintroducing the Standard Emergency Warning Signal to draw attention to broadcast 
warnings about life threatening fires; 
 extending the broadcasting of official warnings to commercial radio and television; 
 allowing the reintroduction of sirens in local communities where there is demand for them; 
 supporting the acceleration of the full introduction of a nationally developed telephone based 
automatic warning system; 
 pursuing research into the development of improved fire danger index systems;  
 enhancing the role of the Bureau of Meteorology in issuing daily information on bushfire risk; 
 improving technology and processes to accelerate the updating of common bushfire 
information on agency websites; 
 increasing the capacity of the bushfire emergency networks, the Victorian Bushfire 
Information Line, Telstra’s Triple Zero service and the Emergency Services 
Telecommunications Authority to better handle peak demands, and to work more 
collaboratively during severe fire risk days. 
Many of these changes will need to be accompanied by an education campaign so that people 
understand the changes and how to interpret the information that is provided. Much of this work has 
been undertaken and is now integrated and in use presently, although these information 
communication and warning systems have not been tested to the magnitude and extent of the ‘Black 
Saturday’ bushfire emergency. 
5 Managing Resource Allocation and Coordination 
Within Victoria there are principally two bushfire response organisations, namely the CFA and DSE 
that are tasked with responding to bushfire emergencies within rural and regional Victoria. The CFA is 
largely staffed by trained local community volunteers and the DSE is a state government department 
consisting of paid personal. The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
(MFB) is largely dedicated to fire and rescue response within the urban built environment of 
Melbourne and is generally only deployed in bushfire emergencies when requested by the CFA (CFA 
2012; DSE 2012; MFB 2012). 
However, from this research paper’s perspective it is the CFA organisational response, 
communication systems and the information flows during a bushfire incident that is of interest, as 
applied in a specific case study situation. The VSM approach to modelling organisational 
communication should provide insight into the communication structures and information flows that 
occurred within the CFA organisation during the specific bushfire event. Although, initially it is 
necessary to provide some background and an overview explanation of the VSM approach and how it 
is applied, as the following example outlines.   
6. Viable System Modelling  
A viable system is one that is deemed to be adaptable and is capable of continuing to meet the 
demands and challenges of a changing environment. The Viable System Modelling (VSM) approach 
can be utilised to express an abstract model of a viable system and afford an applicable description of 
an organisational system that is viable and capable of functional autonomy (Beer 1985).   
This system modelling approach extends on the earlier work of Beer (1985) in defining the laws that 
govern a viable system and their application for comprehending and determining the viability of an 
enterprise system and for coping with system complexity. The purpose of the Viable Systems Model 
(VSM) approach is to diagnose or design organisational structure and communication by 
distinguishing between five management functions and a number of vertical and horizontal 
communication channels. Through the application of a recursive process, VSM enables the 
description and comparison of various functions at differing organisational levels from community to 
international, and is most beneficial when applied via a shared agreement regarding the focal entity 
for modelling, its system boundaries and fundamental goals (Beer 1985; Leonard & Beer 1994).  
The research of Hutchinson and Warren (2002) applied the VSM framework and its principles to 
managing the security of large multi-level organisational information systems to detect, check and 
identify system security threats and vulnerabilities as they appear. By applying VSM and utilising its 
local subsystem monitoring it is possible to distinguish between threatening and non-threatening 
behaviours and adjust the whole system in response. From the research perspective of Hutchinson 
and Warren (2002), VSM provides a framework to manage cooperatively, the normal organisational 
information system functions and security concerns as a single overall information system to provide 
continuous system security that takes into consideration all levels within the greater system view. 
In order to utilise VSM with this system approach, it is essential to understand the dynamics of its 
applicability as illustrated in Figure 1. VSM consists of five subsystem component structures or 
functions as follows (Warren & Hutchinson 2005): 
 Implementation (S1): this function consists of semi-autonomous units, which carry out the 
operational tasks in the system and are fundamental to the existence or purpose(s) of the 
system by interacting with their local environment and each other. Each unit has its own local 
management function and connects to wider management by the vertical information flows. 
This function is the ‘doing’ part of an organisation and with each recursive element of VSM; 
each S1 has another VSM embedded. 
 Co-ordination (S2): this function coordinates the S1 units to ensure that each S1 unit acts in 
the best interest of the whole system, rather than its own. This could be represented by 
something as simple as a timetable, or as subtle as morale among the workforce. 
 Internal Control (S3): the function that interprets policy information from ‘higher’ functions 
(S4), and ‘lower’ functions. It controls the operational levels but its function is not to create 
policy, only to implement it. The periodic auditing of information arriving from the S1 function 
ensures its quality and correctness and denoted as the S3* audit function in the model. 
 Intelligence and Development (S4): the function that acts as a filter of information from the S3 
function and the overall outside environment. Its purpose is to ensure that policy-making 
function (S5) information is current before transmitting decisions to S3. 
 Strategy and Policy (S5): the function responsible for the direction of the whole system, which 
must balance the requirements of both internal and external factors. 
  
Figure 1. The Viable System Model (Warren & Hutchinson 2005) 
In this example, the data flows between S1 and S5 and the environment as shown in Figure 1 
indicates the potential points of vulnerability to a 'computer-based attack'. With this conceptual viable 
system model an organisation can prepare strategies and tactics to make the system 'non-viable' or 
dysfunctional. The logic behind applying VSM is that through investigating functional shortcomings in 
this manner it can improve organisation preparedness and identify its weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
by highlighting possible avenues for attack (Warren & Hutchinson 2005). 
It is the disruption or destruction of information systems that can cause serious loss of service to 
customers and increasingly information systems are under threat from both internal and external 
sources, and there is a need to establish a robust and dynamic response to protect information assets 
(Gokhale & Banks 2004). In view of the structure of information flows and their reliance upon 
information systems, there is obviously a need to establish ways to protect such systems and the 
VSM may offer benefits from this perspective.  
It is with this in mind that VSM framework is applied in the following case study context as a means of 
modelling the viability of the communication systems supporting the information flows for the CFA 
during a specific bushfire incident. The research intention is to apply the VSM approach to the case 
study description to assess the effectiveness and viability of the communication systems and 
resilience of the supporting communication infrastructures utilised by the CFA during the Bendigo 
bushfire incident on ‘Black Saturday’.  
6. Case Study – The Bendigo Fire 
The following case study was based upon evidence submitted, to the Royal Commission reviewing 
the Bushfire of 2009 (Cooke, 2009). 
The incident control centre managing and coordinating the fire fighting activities at Bendigo on ‘Black 
Saturday’ was almost entirely cut off in its communications with firefighters and could not get detailed 
updates of the blaze as it burned on the edge of the town. Country Fire Authority (CFA) incident 
controller Peter Rogasch told the Royal Commission into the February bushfires that the centre he 
was managing on Adam Street in Bendigo had virtually no radio communication with firefighters in the 
field and could only tune in to what was being said about how the fire was developing on the central 
radio system. 
The centre, which was set up for a less complex level-two fire, was equipped with two computers but 
he could not log on to the CFA's network and only about one in 10 attempts to contact people on their 
mobile phones succeeded, he said. Heavy smoke played havoc with radio channels and a back-up 
telephone system limited the people that could be contacted. 
Mr Rogasch said due to these circumstances decisions about where to send resources and set up 
road blocks were made by those on the fire ground. He sent observers out to gather information but, 
''once they got out there … we really couldn't talk to them either''. 
The centre had no information until 6pm and Mr Rogasch received a detailed briefing at 9.30pm, 
hours after the fire's main impact. The fire, also known as the Bracewell Street or Long Gully fire, 
began around 4.35pm and it burned about 330 hectares, killed one person and destroyed 58 homes. 
The following is an applied assessment of the case study using the VSM criteria. The assessment is: 
S1 Implementation 
The impact upon the S1 is major; the localized fire fighting units would be able to fight the fires, but 
only in an ad-hoc fashion. Without intelligence or coordination their applied strategic approach to fight 
fighting may be sub-optimal. 
S2 Co-ordination 
Co-ordination of the localised control of the S1 (Bendigo) would be impacted. Ad-hoc strategies and 
approaches would to be developed in real time to try and implement coordination. There would also a 
lack of upwards coordination with the CFA Headquarters (Burwood). The backup communication 
devices also failed. 
 
S3 Internal Control 
Internal control would have failed. Strategic direction from the CFA Headquarters (Burwood) would 
not be passed to Regional Control (Bendigo). Ad-hoc measures would need to be developed in real 
time, but the 170 kilometre distance between the CFA headquarters (Burwood a suburb of 
Melbourne) and Regional Control Centre (Bendigo) would be an issue and the rapid occurrences of 
other fires in separate locations across Victoria is a major issue.. 
S4 Intelligence and Development  
The role of S4/S5 is to try and determine the reason for the attack, for example, possible security 
weakness  
S5 Strategy and Policy 
The organisation (CFA) would need to (as they did) develop a more robust and resilient 
communication strategy and robust infrastructure. 
In summary, this VSM assessment highlights some major communication shortcomings that became 
apparent as the situation and response circumstances of the Bendigo fire changed, which had a 
notable impact on the resilience and ongoing viability of the CFA communication systems.  
It is evident that management and emergency response coordination issues were significantly and 
adversely affected due to the inability of the organisation to communicate advice both upward to CFA 
headquarters (Burwood) and downward to the Regional Control Centre (Bendigo) and the CFA fire-
fighters on the ground at the fire site. From a wider perspective of the events of ‘Black Saturday’, this 
also indicates some of the shortcomings with communication infrastructures during such catastrophic 
circumstances that were evidenced by the broader activities of coordinating and managing numerous 
major bushfire responses in a number of differing state-wide locations simultaneously.   
7. Discussion 
Although it is impractical to consider that any emergency management organisational communication 
system could adequately cope with every situation effectively and simultaneously under such a load 
as occurred during the events of ‘Black Saturday’. There is nevertheless an expectation that 
emergency service communications can be maintained to some rudimentary extent though the 
redundant communication system structures in place. However, the events of and circumstances of 
‘Black Saturday’ could not be predicted to have the effect they did on the communication systems and 
information flows of the CFA. Furthermore, as discussed previously from the public perspective, those 
citizens directly affected were also unable to access relevant up-to-date information regarding the fire 
pertaining to their situation and nor was the CFA able to effectively deliver early warnings either. 
In this paper we have presented a vision of the future of emergency management that requires more 
robust support structures for the inclusion of activities and information from members of the public 
during disasters and mass emergency events. Such a vision relies on integration of multiple subfields 
of critical infrastructure systems resilience, steadfast information technology and communication 
systems, including in-built redundancy and a commitment to an understanding of the domain of 
application.  
Emergency management is more than service personnel responding quickly to a situation; it is also 
about providing, capturing and distributing relevant and up-to-date information across a number of 
infrastructure enabled communication systems. Emergency management communication for 
coordinated responses and for public awareness need to consider adopting approaches that go 
beyond ‘pull’ technologies and actually ‘push’ information out to those located within the vicinity of the 
event. Also consideration should be given to incorporating the public as a source of situational 
intelligence that can utilise information communication technology infrastructures to provide 
information, which can potentially play a transformational role in a crisis (Palen et al 2010).  
Although there are implications regarding the quantity, quality and trustworthiness the information 
provided by the public, if applied constructively there is great potential to utilise mobile phone 
networks, social media and alike to further enhance the flow of information. This requires 
consideration of how to utilise and filter both the formal and informal information communication 
mechanisms within emergency management organisations, their response services, information 
accuracy and relevance, including warnings to the public to ensure effective distribution to those that 
need it.  
8. Conclusion 
Coordination and conveying up-to-date information is critical to managing incidents such as bushfires 
and the knowledge generated from information flows provides the opportunity to forewarn the public 
and better manage and coordinate emergency responses. If the lines of communication are not 
resilient, too narrow or collapse due to infrastructure overload stress or failure, then the ability to 
generate good decisions from remote locations is adversely affected. This situation was evident 
during the ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires where the organisational and infrastructure communication 
systems were overloaded and became either ineffective or the quality of information was poor due to 
latency and distribution issues.   
Additionally, the issue of ‘information overload’ arose where emergency response people were 
inundated with information that was not relevant to their current situation; to the point where the 
communication devices were either ignored or turned off. Furthermore, the impact of communication 
infrastructure loss during the emergency also raises issues regarding the level redundancy and the 
applicability of alternative communication mediums within these emergency response communication 
systems.  
The reliance of established communication infrastructures was found to be capacity inadequate and 
less resilient than otherwise expected during the emerging bushfire emergency. In this instance, this 
research utilises the ‘systems approach’ of the VSM modelling technique to exemplify the viability or 
otherwise of established communication and information exchange structures. In this case study the 
information communication structures did not function as expected requiring a rethink of approach to 
better manage information, to distil and disseminate important details quickly. The ‘Black Saturday’ 
Royal Commission findings suggest a review to investigate the underlying communication structures 
of the emergency response agencies to determine if structural and capacity issues need to be 
addressed. At this stage progress has been made towards this end although the pace of change is 
somewhat slower than expected. 
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